Using headline valuation metrics as a barometer can be
particularly dangerous and misleading, especially for the Russell 2000
Index. In addition to distorting the index, a market cap "blind
spot" has created persistent inefficiencies (and opportunities) at the
smaller end of the small cap universe. Our small cap strategy, with a
current median market cap of roughly $350 million, concentrates on smaller
companies because this is precisely where thorough research matters the
most.
During our recent
conversations with institutional investors and consultants, we
have frequently heard that "small caps look expensive."
Indeed, the Russell 2000 currently sports a headline P/E ratio of nearly
30x trailing earnings compared to around 14x for the S&P 500. Is this
conclusive evidence that small caps are overvalued -- especially relative to
large caps?
We have been somewhat
puzzled by this conclusion, as it contradicts what we have been seeing
"on the ground." As bottom up investors, we spend our time
researching one company at a time. While we are inherently intimidated by
high valuations, we continue to come across plenty of small, well-run
enterprises which appear to be both undervalued and out of favor.
Likewise, many of the quarterly earnings conference calls we tune in to have
continued to garner muted interest at best (with some having no Q&A
participants at all)--not exactly a sign of "irrational exuberance"
for small caps. Both of these observations are confirmed by the most
recent additions to our small cap portfolio which are valued well below the
Russell 2000 Index by most metrics. So...what gives?
One part of the explanation
lies in the structural market bias we have previously referred to as the
"market cap blind spot." A majority of sell side analysts
and professional money managers concentrates on the largest companies in the
small cap universe and ignores the smallest ones. This stubborn reality
is reflected in the holdings data for buy-siders: the average small
cap mutual fund in the Bloomberg universe has a median market cap of $1.8
billion - a full three and a half times the $491 million median of its Russell
2000 benchmark. In addition to creating persistent inefficiencies in the
small cap marketplace, this bias has distorted valuations within the index
itself. An average of the valuation metrics presented indicates that
the largest quintile of the Russell 2000 is 20% more expensive than the
smallest. This relationship underpins a counterintuitive dynamic
in small caps, namely, the size of the company--not necessarily the merits
of the business--is often the determining factor of its valuation. This
contrasts sharply with large caps, where size generally plays no discernible
role in company valuations.
Evidence of the Blind Spot
Russell
2000 Median Valuations by Quintile (10/31/2012)*
Market Cap (Millions)
|
Trailing P/E
|
Forward P/E
|
Trailing EV/EBITDA
|
# of Analysts
|
|
1 (Largest)
|
1,642
|
18.6
|
15.2
|
13.5
|
10
|
2
|
854
|
16.7
|
14.1
|
12.4
|
8
|
3
|
491
|
16.3
|
13.9
|
13.3
|
7
|
4
|
269
|
16.4
|
13.6
|
11.8
|
5
|
5 (Smallest)
|
150
|
14.9
|
13.2
|
11.3
|
4
|
S&P 500 Median Valuations by Quintile (10/31/2012)*
Market Cap (Millions)
|
Trailing P/E
|
Forward P/E
|
Trailing EV/EBITDA
|
# of Analysts
|
|
1 (Largest)
|
56,433
|
15.2
|
13.2
|
12.3
|
28
|
2
|
19,999
|
14.7
|
13.8
|
12.4
|
24
|
3
|
7,722
|
16.4
|
13.8
|
12.2
|
19
|
4
|
7,668
|
16.8
|
14.5
|
12.2
|
19
|
5 (Smallest)
|
3,932
|
15.5
|
12.8
|
11.5
|
16
|
*We chose to use median data to eliminate
the effect of extreme numbers and also believe it is more representative of
company valuations found in each quintile. Data assembled from Bloomberg,
L.P.
|
Because of market cap bias, the Russell 2000's headline P/E
(a weighted average) is inflated, as the most expensive companies have the
greatest representation in the index. This dynamic is further
compounded by the fact that the Russell 2000 has more than twice the proportion
of companies with exceptionally high P/E ratios* (often caused by marginal
recent profitability). In our view, median data produces a
far more meaningful comparison because it is less affected be these
distortions. We also believe that median data is more indicative of
the valuations of a "typical" company in the index and also more representative of the characteristics which an active manager is most likely
to uncover during his or her research.
*10% of Russell 2000 names have a P/E ratio
over 40 compared to only 5% of S&P 500 names.
Median Data Comparison (10/31/2012)
|
|||||||
Market Cap (Millions)
|
Trailing P/E
|
Forward P/E
|
Trailing EV/EBITDA
|
# of Analysts
|
Sales Growth
|
Earnings Growth
|
|
Median R2K
Company
|
491
|
16.9
|
14.2
|
8.9
|
7
|
5.5%
|
7.0%
|
Median S&P
500 Company
|
12,495
|
15.9
|
13.6
|
9.0
|
23
|
2.4%
|
4.5
|
When examined on a median
basis, the valuation disparity narrows substantially: small caps are only 4%
more expensive than their large cap counterparts despite appearing twice
as expensive on a headline P/E basis. We think that this slight
valuation premium for small caps is more than warranted considering their
stronger sales and earnings growth characteristics (in red).